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1.1.1. CONSCIOUS BRAIN, METACOGNITION AND SCHIZOPHRE-
NIA 
 
According to Aristotle, processes such as thinking, feeling, perceiving, remem-
bering as psychological attributes of humans reflect the soul that cannot be di-
vided from the body and exists as the form that makes a body a living body 
(Bennett, 2007; Onians, 1954). Later, Descartes divided this unity of form and 
matter and proposed dualistic concept of body (res extensa) and mind (res cogi-
tans). In his work “Treatise of Man” he described humans as “earthen ma-
chines” based on reflex actions, who have sensory consciousness integrated via 
pineal gland which he proposed as a central unitary organ of human body. In 
his later work “Passion of the soul” he placed the “rational soul” into the pineal 
gland and defined self-consciousness that differentiates humans from animals 
(Bob and Mashour, 2011; Fishman, 2008; Smith, 1998). In his famous quota-
tion “Cogito ergo sum”, Descartes reflected basic meanings of consciousness 
and its typical qualities represented by abilities of self-reflection and insight. 
In addition, Descartes proposed theory of information integration in the pi-
neal gland and anticipated recent problem of binding of distributed information 
in the brain (“binding problem”) that is crucial for understanding mechanisms 
of consciousness and self-awareness (Baars et al., 2013; Crick and Koch, 1990; 
Engel and Singer, 2001). In this historical context recent studies indicate that 
binding of distributed information in the brain represents basic mechanism of 
consciousness that manifests through neural correlates emerging in EEG specif-
ically as fast oscillations in the gamma range (Baars et al., 2013; Cavinato et 
al., 2014; Lou et al., 2010; Uhlhaas et al., 2009). As would be possible to ex-
pect, similar findings of gamma oscillations were found also in highest form of 
consciousness and self-awareness representing conscious recognition of one’s 
own mental state (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008; Sandkuhler 
and Bhattacharya, 2008). Based on these findings consciousness including its 
most developed forms as self-reflection, conscious awareness of subject’s own 
action and “insight” became a topic of scientific research about most subjective 
components of human being. 
According to recent research disturbances of self-awareness and conscious 
experience have a critical role in pathophysiology of schizophrenia and in this 
context schizophrenia is currently understood as a disorder characterized by 
distortions of the acts of awareness, self-consciousness and self-monitoring 
(Frith, 1987; Gallagher, 2000; Kircher and Leube, 2003; Lou, 2012; Mishara et 
al., 2014).  
This conceptualization of brain and cognitive disintegration in schizophrenia 
is reminiscent of the concept of ‘schizophrenia’ as “split mind” proposed by 
Bleuler in his Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias emphasizing 




     





gen Bleuler began developing his view that the core problem among individu-
als with psychosis is determined by disruptions of thought-linkages and deficits 
in the coordination of different psychological functions. These anomalies were 
thought to lead to a “loosening of associations” related to the process of split-
ting. Bleuler defined the term splitting as a process of formation of complex 
mental structures linked to incompatible experiences producing numerous divi-
sions in mental processes (Bleuler, 1919). In his work: “Dementia praecox or 
the group of the schizophrenias”, Bleuler (1911), introduced the term “schi-
zophrenia” to describe the illness that replaced Kraepelin’s dementia praecox 
(Bleuler, 1919, 1950b). Bleuler thought that: “…the ’splitting’ of the different 
psychic functions is one of its most important characteristics” (Bleuler, 1950b). 
According to Bleuler (1950) some psychic complexes creating aggregates of 
thoughts, feelings and affects may dominate personality structure, while other 
complexes may be “split off” and operate as fragments connected with the oth-
ers in an ”illogical” way. Similarly described personality structure also Jung 
(1909), who proposed that associations are linked to complex mental aggre-
gates that connect emotional, episodic and semantic memories (Jung, 1909). 
In historical context Bleuler’s definition of “split mind” as a characteristic 
feature of disturbed cognition in schizophrenia is related to Descartes’ proposal 
the binding multidimensional information from various sensory modalities that 
enables conscious experience (Barrera-Mera and Barrera-Calva, 1998; Bob, 
2015). The so-called “binding problem” leads to the unresolved question where 
and how the information is integrated into the whole and how this information 
is specifically linked to previous experience in the spatio-temporal memory. An 
important question for further research of the integration of distributed brain 
activities is whether the essential integrative role can be attributed to a specific 
structure in the brain or whether this ability is inherent to the cognitive network 
as a whole. In addition it is not known how spatial convergency is provided for 
the synthesis of processed information that emerges and for example, there are 
only a few neural connections between specific visual areas that correlate with 
color and motion (Barrera-Mera and Barrera-Calva, 1998; LaRock, 2006; Zeki, 
1994, 2003). For example, visual consciousness requires activity in many areas 
of the brain and the components of the high-level visual representations, close-
ly linked to focused attention, need to access these structures, form a perceptual 
object and bind together various features of an object (Cavanagh, 2011; Zeki 
and Bartels, 1999). 
A key evidence for the binding problem reported studies of primate extra-
striate visual cortex which have shown that different neurons within the visual 
system participate on processing of different features of a seen object (Desi-
mone et al., 1985; Ghose and Ts'o, 1997; Schein and Desimone, 1990). For ex-
ample, Desimone et al. (1985) have found that neurons in visual area (V4) and 
inferior temporal cortex (IT) are sensitive to many kinds of information rele-
vant to object recognition. They also found that special contribution of V4 neu-
rons to visual processing may lie in specific spatial and spectral interactions 
and that many different stimulus qualities are processed in parallel mode of 




     





(1997), who also found that V4 contains modular assemblies of cells related to 
particular aspects of processed object-based representations (Ghose and Ts'o, 
1997). There is also evidence in research of moving objects that other neurons 
in the middle temporal area and the medial superior temporal area encode vari-
ous aspects related to the motion of the stimulus (O'Keefe and Movshon, 1998; 
Treue and Andersen, 1996). 
Significant contribution to this discussion about mechanisms of large scale 
integration reported Crick and Koch (1992, 2003) in their studies of the visual 
consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1992; Crick and Koch, 2003). They proposed 
that the problem of binding may not be resolved only as a simple consequence 
of synchronization among large groups of neurons. As a basis for that opinion 
they emphasize the binding problem of distributed information representing a 
seen object by groups of synchronized excited neurons that are located at dif-
ferent parts of the brain. This problem has emerged in connection to findings 
that features of an object such as color, shape, texture, size, brightness, etc. 
produce activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Crick and Koch, 1992; 
Crick and Koch, 2003; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Singer, 2001). In con-
text of these findings the hypothetical center for brain information convergency 
that enables perceptual consciousness and conscious experience was termed 
“Cartesian theatre” (Crick and Koch, 1992; Dennett, 1991). Recent neuros-
cience, however, has not located a distinct place in which distributed informa-
tion in the brain comes together. Additionally, there is evidence that neocortical 
processing is distributed during all sensory and motor functions (Singer, 2001). 
The predominant view in neuroscience of consciousness is that neuronal 
synchronization is a phenomenon that is necessary for the large scale integra-
tion of distributed neuronal activities. There is increasing experimental evi-
dence that coherent neuronal assemblies in the brain are functionally linked by 
phase synchronization among simultaneously recorded EEG signals and that 
this time-dependent synchrony between various discrete neuronal assemblies 
represents neural substrate for mental representations such as perception, cog-
nitive functions and memory (Lachaux et al., 1999; Varela et al., 2001). These 
functions are related to distributed macroscopic patterns of neuronal activity 
which involve multiple neuronal subsystems bound into a coherent whole 
(Braitenberg, 1978; Van Putten and Stam, 2001). According to recent data, a 
mechanism that enables binding of distributed macroscopic patterns of neuron-
al activity, represented by neural assemblies, into the coherent whole is still un-
resolved and represents a fundamental problem in neuroscience [i.e., the bind-
ing problem: how the brain codes and integrates distributed neural activities 
during processes connected to perception, cognition and memory] (Arp, 2005; 
Fidelman, 2005; Lee et al., 2003; Velik, 2010; Woolf and Hameroff, 2001). 
The theory of feature binding originates with distributed coding and states that 
neurons involved in the processing of a single object will tend to synchronize 
their firing, while simultaneously desynchronizing their firing from the remain-
ing neurons not involved in the processing of the object (Malsburg and 
Schneider, 1986). An essential feature of neuronal assembly coding is that in-




     





unlimited number of different assemblies (Sannita, 2000; Varela et al., 2001). 
The same neurons can participate in different perceptual events and different 
combinations of these neurons can represent different perceptual objects. Syn-
chronization of these different perceptual objects is related to the integration of 
perceptions into a coherent whole (Singer and Gray, 1995). As a candidate me-
chanism for the integration or binding of distributed brain activities is the so-
called gamma activity—high frequency oscillations of 40 Hz, but often varying 
from 30 to 90 Hz. This activity occurs synchronously across brain regions and 
underlies the integration of diverse brain activities (Singer and Gray, 1995). 
In this context, majority of recent studies on neural correlate of conscious-
ness have focused on EEG analysis and observed functionally relevant periods 
of synchronization mainly in gamma frequency band in various species and 
brain structures during attention, perception, motor and memory tasks (Jensen 
et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2003; Singer, 2001). Together these findings suggest 
that a candidate mechanism for the integration or binding of distributed brain 
activities is the gamma activity (mainly about 40 Hz). The suggested mechan-
ism of the gamma waves is that the wave that originates in the thalamus repeat-
edly oscillates 40 times per second in the brain back and forth, which enable to 
different neuronal circuits to enter into synchrony with the perceptual informa-
tion that is processed in thalamus. This integrative process enables to these si-
multaneously active neuronal clusters oscillate together during transient periods 
of synchronized firing and this coherent whole enables to connect various 
memories and associations involved in the process and generate a coherent 
process of perception, cognitive processing, memory and consciousness (Buz-
saki, 2006). 
Through this mechanism gamma activity occurs synchronously across brain 
regions and underlies the integration of diverse brain activities (Singer and 
Gray, 1995). Crucial result of these studies is a direct link between visual per-
ception and gamma synchrony in the cat visual cortex reported by Eckhorn et 
al. (1988) (Eckhorn et al., 1988). Following this finding, functional significance 
of synchronous gamma activity in selective attention, perceptual processing 
and recognition was repeatedly demonstrated in animal and human studies 
(Jensen et al., 2007; Meador et al., 2002; Rodriguez et al., 2004). Together 
these data strongly suggest that complex cognitive functions are organized at a 
global level that enables to integrate primitive functions organized in localized 
brain regions (Bob, 2011; Bressler and Kelso, 2001). In this context, current 
predominant hypothesis relies on the assumption of the global mode of func-
tioning that is based on large-scale information processing that requires me-
chanisms of functional integration of multiple disparate neural assemblies 
(Fries et al., 2001; Jensen et al., 2007; Varela et al., 2001). 
Although the majority of research on feature binding has focused on syn-
chronous gamma activity, there is evidence that synchronous activities in other 
frequency bands may also participate in functional integration of distributed 
neural activities into the coherent whole (Bressler et al., 1993; Lee et al., 2003). 
Following these findings Dennett (1991) proposed “a multiple drafts” theory of 




     





but rather a distributed one. Instead of a single central place i.e. “Cartesian 
theatre,” there are various events of content-fixation that occur in various plac-
es at various times in the brain (Dennett, 1991).  
On the other hand there are possible limitations and controversial points 
whether neural synchrony mediates visual feature grouping or just represents 
its neural correlate that in principle does not explain the process of feature 
binding or “binding problem” (Bob, 2011; Bosman et al., 2014; Merker, 2013; 
Palanca and DeAngelis, 2005; Ray and Maunsell, 2015). Nevertheless the evi-
dence for this view linking consciousness and gamma activity was reported by 
a whole series of experimental results in cognitive neuroscience and psycholo-
gy (LaRock, 2006; Van der Velde and De Kamps, 2006; Varela and Thompson, 
2003; Von der Malsburg, 1996; Zeki, 2003). 
Recent findings indicate that these characteristic mental deficits related to 
conscious integration in schizophrenia are typically linked to abnormalities in 
brain development and neurocognitive deficits in information processing, ver-
bal memory and executive functioning (Braff et al., 2007; Green et al., 2013; 
Hori et al., 2012; Light and Braff, 2005; Toulopoulou et al., 2007). In this re-
view, we propose that these cognitive deficits typical for schizophrenia may be 
related to specific deficits of information integration in the process of neural 
binding. Such deficits in neural binding may be linked to the disintegration of 




1.1.2. DISTURBED NEURAL SYNCHRONY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 
 
In this context, accumulating evidence from electrophysiological, physiological 
and anatomical studies indicates that abnormalities in the synchronized oscilla-
tory activity of neurons may play a central role in the pathophysiology of schi-
zophrenia (Bob, 2012; Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010; Woo et 
al., 2010). These studies show that schizophrenia involves abnormalities in 
brain oscillatory activity as measured by EEG synchrony. Specifically, there 
are abnormalities in gamma band activity of EEG electromagnetic spectrum 
and likely these abnormalities are related to cognitive deficits and other symp-
toms of schizophrenia (Bob et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2003; Uhlhaas et al., 2006; 
Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010; Woo et al., 2010). For example, Uhlhaas et al. 
(2006) have found that increased phase synchrony correlates with the positive 
symptoms of delusions and hallucinations (Uhlhaas et al., 2006). Similarly, Lee 
et al. in an auditory oddball paradigm experiment reported changes in frontal 
and left hemisphere gamma synchrony. They found that positive symptoms re-
lated to Reality Distortion are associated with increased right synchrony, Psy-
chomotor Poverty is related to decreased left hemisphere synchrony and Disor-
ganisation symptoms show a widespread enhancement with a delay in frontal 
Gamma synchrony (Lee et al., 2010). Other study examining relationship be-




     





symptoms has been reported by Mulert et al. (2011), who found positive corre-
lation between auditory hallucinations symptom scores and phase synchroniza-
tion between the primary auditory cortices (Mulert et al., 2011). Also another 
study documenting positive correlations between the phase synchronization of 
beta and gamma oscillations and hallucination symptoms in schizophrenia pa-
tients has been reported by (Spencer et al., 2004). These deficits in neural oscil-
lations likely may represent the functional correlate of dysconnectivity in cor-
tical networks underlying the associative splitting and characteristic fragmenta-
tions of mind and behavior.  
In context of understanding schizophrenia as associative splitting and dis-
turbed contextual awareness, Uhlhaas et al. (2006) found that deficits in Gestalt 
perception in schizophrenia patients are associated with reduced phase syn-
chrony in the beta-band (20–30 Hz) but not in the gamma-band (40–70 Hz) 
suggesting that the coordination deficit of neural activities are related to specif-
ic cognitive dysfunctions associated with Gestalt and contextual associations 
(Uhlhaas et al., 2006).  
Linking disturbances of integrative mental functions has been also reported 
in studies focused on deficits in self-monitoring. For example, Ford et al. 
(2008), who reported relationship between gamma synchrony and corollary 
discharges in schizophrenic patients. They found that gamma band neural syn-
chrony that preceded pressing of the button was decreased in the patients, 
which is consistent with findings that deficits in self-monitoring and willed ac-
tions could result from a dysfunction of the corollary discharge system reflect-
ing communication between the frontal and temporal lobes related to the 
breakdown of self-monitoring, self-agency self-awareness and insight (Fein-
berg, 1978; Fishman, 2008; Ford and Mathalon, 2005; Ford et al., 2001; Friston 
and Frith, 1995; Frith, 1987; Taylor, 2011). These deficits in schizophrenia are 
typically related to impaired information processing that may increase the 
modularity of brain functions (Ford et al., 2008) which may cause that for ex-
ample, inner speech is misidentified as external voices (Ford et al., 2007; Pou-
let and Hedwig, 2007).  
These disturbed interactions between brain structures produce patterns of 
temporal disorganization with decreased functional connectivity that may un-
derlie specific perceptual and cognitive states and cause disintegration of in-
formation across specialized brain areas of the brain in schizophrenic patients 
(Crossley et al., 2009; Kuhn and Gallinat, 2013; Parnaudeau et al., 2013; 
Sporns et al., 2000; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010). This disintegration of con-
sciousness probably produces defective self-monitoring and self-experiencing 
(Feinberg, 1978; Ford and Mathalon, 2005; Ford et al., 2001) and this lack of 
information integration likely reflects the process of functional segregation of 
sets of neurons localized in different cortical areas and may represent an under-
lying mechanism of process of dissociation, disturbance of conscious expe-
rience and self leading to lack of contextual awareness, self-monitoring and in-
sight (Bob and Mashour, 2011).  
In this context, interesting data related to contextual awareness have been 




     





of attachment and EEG connectivity using coherence analysis. They found that 
after administration of the adult attachment interview in patients with dissocia-
tion these patients did not show increased EEG connectivity displayed by 
healthy controls. These data suggest specific disintegrative effect of retrieval of 
traumatic attachment memories and disturbed contextual awareness in dissocia-
tive patients(Farina et al., 2014). This result is in agreement with data reported 
by Lee et al. (2014), indicating that functional connectivity in resting state in 
patients with PTSD is decreased compared to controls and these levels of func-
tional connectivity in the patients were significantly correlated with PTSD 
symptom severity. These data also suggest that decreased connectivity reflects 
contextual disturbances related to traumatic and stressful memories(Lee et al., 
2014). 
On the other hand, similar findings on EEG connectivity associated with 
contextual awareness were studied by Bowden et al. (2005) during an expe-
rience of insight. They found a sudden burst of high-frequency gamma-band in 
scalp EEG reflecting neural activity immediately before insight solutions. They 
concluded that solvers abruptly change the focus of their solving efforts just be-
fore insight, allowing information linking various problem elements to manifest 
into consciousness (Bowden et al., 2005). Characteristic changes in gamma os-
cillations during increased levels of awareness during the experience of insight 
reported also Sheth et. al. (2009), who recorded multivariate electroencephalo-
gram signals in healthy participants while they solved verbal puzzles. They 
found gamma band increased in right fronto-central and frontal electrode re-
gions when the solution was correct, and when participants used successful (vs. 
unsuccessful) utilization of the external hint. They proposed that increased 
awareness and insight typically reflect transformative thoughts characterized by 
efficient recovery of information from memory and focused attention to a prob-
lem (Sheth et al., 2009). Some data also indicate, that for example artists as 
compared to non-artists also show significantly higher phase synchrony in EEG 
in the high frequency beta and gamma bands due to their ability of binding var-
ious details of the complex artworks to create internal representations (Bhatta-
charya and Petsche, 2002). Also other studies indicate that increased gamma 
oscillations are closely associated with contextual awareness, insight, emer-
gence of new perspectives and creative solutions (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Sandkuhler and Bhattacharya, 2008) and conscious 
awareness related to attentional focus in general (Baars, 2002; Tononi, 2004; 
Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010).  
Taken together accumulating evidence from experimental and clinical stu-
dies shows that the process of dynamic binding and information integration that 
enable consciousness and awareness are related to transient and precise syn-
chronization of neuronal activities which is significantly disturbed in schizoph-
renia (Lee et al., 2003; Tononi and Edelman, 2000). These disturbed interac-
tions produce patterns of temporal disorganization in neural synchronization 
which is related to decreased functional connectivity underlying specific per-




     





specialized brain areas in schizophrenic patients (Bob and Mashour, 2011; 
Sporns et al., 2000).  
These disturbances in neural coordination may represent the functional cor-
relate of dysconnectivity and binding deficits in cortical networks. These find-
ings provide novel concepts which connect neuroscience descriptions with 
processes of conscious disintegration and phenomenological levels describing 
typical subjective experiences related to schizophrenia including perceptual 
anomalies, delusions and subjective experiences related to intentionality and 
meaning of life that as specific subjective qualities of individual experience 
cannot be reduced on description of brain processes (Hoffman et al., 2008; Mi-
shara and Fusar-Poli, 2013; Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007). 
In this context, recent findings show crucially new concept how we can un-
derstand schizophrenia without reductionist viewpoints usually represented by 
a postulate that psychological processes including self-reference and conscious 
experience per se represent just epiphenomena of neurophysiological processes 
(Bob, 2015).  
These current findings have intriguing and important implications for thera-
py that in the future may be focused on meaningful connections and relation-
ships between mind and brain that via psychotherapeutic influences may enable 
to integrate brain functions.  
 
 
1.1.3. STRESS, TRAUMA AND MENTAL DISINTEGRATION 
 
According to recent findings typical neurocognitive deficits in schizophrenia, 
mainly secondary verbal memory, immediate memory, executive functioning 
and vigilance are closely linked to dysfunctional behavior and impaired psy-
chosocial functioning (Lin et al., 2011; Lipkovich et al., 2009). For example, 
attention and working memory are closely associated with social and functional 
competence and neurocognitive deficits have also been detected prior to onset 
of illness (Bowie et al., 2008; Carrión et al., 2011; Kurtz, 2011; Lin et al., 
2011; Lipkovich et al., 2009). Such deficits may also influence how individuals 
with schizophrenia can learn new skills as well as accurately detect and re-
spond to environmental demands (Corrigan and Green, 1993; Green).  
In this context, Walker and Diforio (1997) suggest that trauma, stigma, po-
verty, isolation, and attachment patterns play a significant role in the develop-
ment of the neurocognitive abnormalities of schizophrenia. They proposed “a 
neural diathesis-stress model” which integrates the psychosocial and biological 
research on stress in schizophrenia. The model is based on evidence that stress 
worsens symptoms and that the diathesis is associated with a heightened re-
sponse to stressors. The authors indicate that one possible neural mechanism is 
the augmenting effect of the HPA axis on dopamine synthesis and receptors 
that in turn may lead to abnormal dopamine receptor functioning (Walker and 




     





in schizophrenia these abnormalities could significantly contribute to hypersen-
sitivity to stress in schizophrenic patients.  
In relation to this work, Read et al. (2001) developed “a traumagenic neuro-
developmental model”. The model is based on basic principles of the diathesis-
stress model of schizophrenia and proposes that a genetic deficit creates a pre-
disposing vulnerability in the form of oversensitivity to stress related to early 
adversive life events such as child abuse or parental neglect which, according 
to recent  evidence may contribute to the development of schizophrenia (Bob 
and Mashour, 2011; Fan et al., 2008; Gil et al., 2009; Lysaker et al., 2007; Ly-
saker and LaRocco, 2009; Read et al., 2001; Roy, 2005; Sar et al., 2009; Schel-
ler-Gilkey et al., 2004; Vogel et al., 2009). For example, Lysaker and LaRocco 
(2008) studied the prevalence of significant traumas in schizophrenia patients 
and reported that two thirds of these chronic schizophrenia patients exhibited 
clinically significant trauma symptoms including intrusive experiences, defen-
sive avoidance, dissociative experiences and other symptoms of mental disinte-
gration (Lysaker and Larocco, 2008). Also another recent study indicates that 
hallucinating schizophrenia patients had higher percentages of dissociative ex-
periences in comparison to other schizophrenia patients (Perona-Garcelan et al., 
2008).  
Together these findings suggest that “mental disintegration” as a decreased 
ability to integrate cognitive and emotional information that enables to form in-
tegrated self in the sense of Bleuler’s concept of splitting may be an important 
aspect in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. Recent findings indicate that psy-
chological splitting in schizophrenia is likely specifically presented on a neural 
level as disrupted organization in neural communication that may complemen-
tarily reflect interrelated processes between mind and brain underlying distur-
bances of mental integration that likely present a neural representation of the 
splitting in schizophrenia (Bob and Mashour, 2011). As recent data suggest, 
splitting as a process of mental disintegration is also closely linked to deficits 
of the mind’s metacognitive abilities, which means disturbed ability to think 
about thinking and create connections between mental events and integrate 
them into larger complex representations (Bob and Mashour, 2011; Lysaker et 
al., 2013a).  
As suggested by Moscowitz (2008), when Bleuler proposed disturbances of 
associations as the core feature of schizophrenia, he did not refer merely to 
confusion due to the intrusion of unrelated ideas and to the loss of fundamental 
ability of “associational synthesis” (p. 44) which reduced the understanding of 
oneself as an embodied agent to a set of fragments which no longer served as a 
guide for goal directed activity(Moskowitz, 2008).  Bleuler assumed that this 
lack of synthesis had an organic origin but could also serve as a proximate 
cause of dysfunction. Bleuler presented detailed accounts of schizophrenia pa-
tients who are not able to function socially or vocationally and due to the loss 
of the ability to synthesize associations into larger images of oneself and others 





     






1.1.4. CONSCIOUS AWARENESS AND METACOGNITION 
 
Conscious experience of the self and others requires reflection of what is hap-
pening in the moment within one’s own body and in the world around which is 
called metacognition (Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015). Metacognition as a psy-
chological process represents a spectrum of mental activities that involves 
thinking about thinking, ranging from more discrete acts in which people rec-
ognize specific thoughts and feelings to more synthetic acts in which context of 
intentions, thoughts, feelings, and connections between events, are integrated 
into larger complex representations (Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015; Dimaggio et 
al., 2009; Lysaker et al., 2013d).  
Metacognition describes a range of mental activities ranging from discrete to 
synthetic (Lysaker et al., 2013d; Pinkham et al., 2014). Synthetic forms of me-
tacognition act in a different manner than do specific beliefs or singular judg-
ments that also affect life. Synthesized understandings lend meaning to events, 
and thus, supply reasons why to carry out a certain act and to decide what is 
best done to resolve dilemmas given the unique psychology of oneself and the 
others in one’s life (Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015; Dimaggio et al., 2009; Ly-
saker et al., 2013d).  
Metacognition is related to the construct of mentalizing and both are charac-
terized by an ability to think about oneself and others, though the latter consid-
ers disruptions of these processes happen in the context of disturbed attachment 
(Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015).  Both discrete and synthetic metacognitive ac-
tivities allow persons to form evolving and flexible representations for them-
selves and others and thus are a cornerstone of the ability to regulate affect and 
behavior (Dimaggio et al., 2009; Lysaker et al., 2013d).  
Deficits have been found in abilities to detect very specific mental activities 
such as behaviors, emotions and memories (Bacon et al., 2011; Fourneret et al., 
2002; Van't Wout et al., 2007). Looking at larger psychological phenomena 
persons with schizophrenia experience trait like deficits in metacognition in 
both earlier and later forms of illness (Lysaker et al., 2012; Vohs et al., 2014). 
They may, for instance, experience stable difficulties considering thoughts as 
subjective in nature, recognizing the complex internal states of others, under-
standing how events can be seen from different perspectives, and using meta-
cognitive knowledge to manage distress. Multiple studies have linked meta-
cognitive deficits with negative symptoms (Hamm et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 
2005; McLeod et al., 2014; Nicolo et al., 2012; Rabin et al., 2014) as well as 
intrinsic motivation (Tas et al., 2012; Vohs et al., 2014). Metacognition has al-
so been linked with functional competence (Lysaker et al., 2011b), subjective 
sense of recovery (Kukla et al., 2013), stigma resistance (Nabors et al., 2014), 
therapeutic alliance (Davis et al., 2011), vocational function (Lysaker et al., 






     






1.1.5. METACOGNITION, BRAIN CONNECTIVITY AND PLASTICITY 
 
In addition, current findings show that metacognition as an ability to create a 
“cognitive wholeness” through various association pathways, as already sug-
gested by Bleuler, on neural level likely corresponds to the ability of the brain 
to integrate information mainly linked to EEG synchrony in gamma band and 
other frequencies of which neurobiological substratum is unknown (Bob, 2011; 
Lee et al., 2003; Peled, 1999; Tononi and Edelman, 2000). From this point of 
view recent research suggests that brain disintegration corresponds to psycho-
logical disintegration (Baars, 2002; Bob, 2015; Crick and Clark, 1994). In this 
context, building metacognitive abilities through specific forms of learning dur-
ing psychotherapy likely also influences the brain integrative processes. These 
findings indicate that learning and memory processes including a wide variety 
of environmental factors may influence development of synaptic connections 
through new gene expression and that psychotherapy as a special learning 
process may specifically influence and modify brain functions, metabolism in 
specific brain structures and also genetic processes (Gabbard, 2000; Kandel, 
1998). 
In this sense, according to recent findings there is evidence that conscious-
ness may integrate brain functions (Baars, 2002; Kanwisher, 2001; Varela et 
al., 2001) and might be a gateway to brain integration that enables access be-
tween otherwise separated neuronal functions (Baars, 2002). In addition, cur-
rent empirical data suggest that various metacognitive practices related to me-
ditation techniques with many culturally different forms likely have very simi-
lar neurophysiological correlates that could be related to increased brain syn-
chrony and integration (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010). Other recent 
data also suggest that meditation, similarly like hypnosis functions through at-
tentional mechanisms that may influence brain processing of incoming sensory 
stimuli and regulate underlying brain dynamics, such as an interplay between 
cortical and subcortical structures and hemispheric interactions (Bob, 2008; 
Crawford, 1994; Edmonston and Moscovitz, 1990; Rainville et al., 2002; Tang 
et al., 2007; Travis and Shear, 2010).  
This influence of consciousness on brain integration may significantly 
change during various states of consciousness, in hypnosis (Baars, 2002), or 
during specific experiences such as psychotherapy or meditation (Fell et al., 
2010; Travis and Shear, 2010).  In this context, recent data indicate that medita-
tion may significantly increase conscious awareness and focus attentional func-
tions characterized by increased beta and gamma activity, reflecting increased 
brain synchrony and integration (Fell et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2007; Travis and 
Shear, 2010), and also may influence brain plasticity and morphology as for 
example grey matter or white matter density (Hölzel et al., 2011; Jang et al., 
2011). Typical and intriguing examples how metacognitive abilities may influ-
ence brain structures show data about “metacognitive” meditation technique 




     





2010; Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011). Using this meditation technique direct intri-
guing influences on cortical thickness and other brain structural changes have 
been reported (Fox et al., 2014; Grant et al., 2013; Hölzel et al., 2011; Lazar et 
al., 2005; Luders et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2012). As recent metanalysis indi-
cates (Fox et al., 2014) numerous studies have found that the gray and white 
matter may be shaped by meditation. This research shows that at least eight 
brain regions may be significantly altered by meditation, mainly regions of 
frontopolar cortex (Brodmann area 10) related to meta-awareness and also ex-
teroceptive and interoceptive body awareness related to sensory cortices and 
insula and may influence memory consolidation and reconsolidation related 
hippocampal activities and morphology. Other findings show that meditation 
may influence emotional and self regulatory processes mainly related to struc-
tures of anterior and mid cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex, and also intra- and 
interhemispheric communication via superior longitudinal fasciculus and cor-
pus callosum.  
Taken together these data are in agreement with recent evidence indicating 
that neural correlates of various mental states related to perception, cognitive 
functions, and memory are based on various levels of information connectivity 
and integration (Baars, 2002; Kanwisher, 2001; Varela et al., 2001). In this 
context, the influence of consciousness on neural integration likely explains the 
brain changes during various states of dissociated consciousness, in hypnosis 
(Baars, 2002; Bob, 2003; Li and Spiegel, 1992; Nelson and Bower, 1990; 
Rainville et al., 2002), or during meditation (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 
2010).    
These changes may occur as a consequence of changes in attentional func-
tions that, according to several data in the case of meditation, are characterized 
by increased beta and gamma activities reflecting increased brain synchrony 
(Fell et al., 2010; Moss, 2002; Stuckey et al., 2005; Tang et al., 2007; Travis et 
al., 2004; Travis and Shear, 2010). Based on these findings metacognition, as a 
most prominent aspect of meditation increasing self-reflective attentional func-
tions, most likely may be described as a highly integrated state of conscious-
ness (Jankowski and Holas, 2014) related to high neuronal connectivity and in-
tegration (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010). This increased connectivi-
ty may appear on various levels of neural functions and allows dynamically 
connected information processing that most likely have a crucial role in inte-
grative processes related to meditation and psychotherapy. In this close rela-
tionship between brain functions and metacognition, it is likely that it may have 
clinical implications that are important to consider. If indeed brain neurocogni-
tive functions through various levels of neural binding interact with metacogni-
tion, then in therapeutic interventions persons need to learn how to function in 
various metacognitive frameworks. In this context, recent development of inte-
grative forms of psychotherapy shows novel perspectives how in practice of 
psychotherapy it is possible to help to form more complex and integrated repre-
sentations of the self and use this knowledge to respond to psychological prob-
lems (Hasson-Ohayon, 2012; Lysaker et al., 2011a; Lysaker et al., 2013b; Sal-




     







1.2.1. CONSCIOUSNESS, AWARENESS OF INSIGHT AND NEURAL 
MECHANISMS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 
 
Conscious states represent manifestations of the brain activities represented as 
unitary, integrated and changeable process reflecting binding of diverse mod-
alities of basic informational and subjective components (Edelman, 2003; 
Edelman et al., 2011). According to recent findings there is a body of evidence 
describing consciousness and self-awareness as integrative processes based on 
large scale activities of the brain (Baars, 2002; Baars et al., 2013; Edelman, 
2003; Tononi, 2004; Tononi and Koch, 2008). Similarly as Descartes in his 
concept, also recent basic theories of information integration are focused on 
mechanisms of binding and suggest that binding between particular parts in the 
brain increases when information has to become conscious (Leisman and Koch, 
2009; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004). In this process input signals are con-
nected in the brain through the dynamic binding of feature specific cells, which 
enables formation of higher order assemblies underlying conscious awareness 
(Baars, 2002; Fries et al., 2001). This process of conscious awareness, when in-
formation reaches the conscious threshold is specifically represented by EEG 
changes, especially changes in the gamma range (Crick and Koch, 1990; Does-
burg et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1989; Gray and Singer, 1989). This basic finding 
has been documented by many studies that reported specific significance of 
synchronous gamma oscillations for conscious awareness (Baars et al., 2013; 
Engel and Singer, 2001; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012; Spencer, 2008; Uhl-
haas and Singer, 2010). 
This relationship of consciousness and gamma activity was also supported 
by studies documenting specific forms of conscious experience related to in-
sight (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 
2008; Sandkuhler and Bhattacharya, 2008; Sheth et al., 2009; Smith and Kou-
nios, 1996). For example, changes in EEG gamma range reflecting the process 
of binding distributed information were reported in close association with in-
sight during transition from unconscious to conscious level (Jung-Beeman et 
al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008; Sandkuhler and Bhattacharya, 2008; Sheth et 
al., 2009; Smith and Kounios, 1996).  
According to these data manifestation of conscious awareness during insight 
is accompanied by burst of gamma activity beginning approximately at the 
moment when a solution becomes available (Smith and Kounios, 1996). In this 
context, strong gamma band response was found as a correlate of selective at-
tention and encoding process during emergence of spontaneous new solutions 
(Sandkuhler and Bhattacharya, 2008) which typically reflect the process of in-
sight when sudden awareness of the solution to a problem emerges, the so-
called “Aha!” phenomenon (Smith, 1998).  
Similarly, Jung-Beeman et. al. (2004) compared cognitive and neural 




     





and after each correct solution indicated whether they solved with or without 
insight. The authors observed two objective neural correlates of insight. In the 
fMRI experiment, they revealed increased activity in the right hemisphere ante-
rior superior temporal gyrus for insight relative to non-insight solution. The 
same region was active during insight solving effort. In their second experi-
ment using EEG they found a sudden burst of high-frequency gamma-band 
neural activity in the same area beginning 0.3 s prior to insight solutions. Their 
results show that the right anterior temporal area is associated with making 
connections across distantly related information during comprehension which 
is a mechanism accompanying insight and that the gamma-band insight effect 
in EEG experiment reflects the sudden transition of solution-related cognitive 
processing from an unconscious to a conscious state (Jung-Beeman et al., 
2004). This very interesting result suggests a dilemma whether gamma activity 
in this condition represents beginning of the conscious experience and a solu-
tion to the problem or it is specifically related to the integration of information 
on the level of the right hemisphere that may be just partially perceived on the 
conscious level. In this context, insight may represent specific process of in-
formation integration that may be to a certain degree, but not fully, represented 
in conscious awareness. This “gestalt” processing during information integra-
tion, which may be just partially conscious, might explain the specific role of 
the right hemisphere in insight phenomena which is in agreement with dysfunc-
tion of the right hemisphere in mentally ill patients that are frequently unable, 
or it is very difficult for them, to have insight (Rotenberg, 1995, 2004).  
Similar findings reported also Sheth et. al. (2009), who recorded multiva-
riate electroencephalogram signals in healthy participants while they solved 
verbal puzzles. They found gamma band increased in right fronto-central and 
frontal electrode regions when the solution was correct, and when participants 
used successful (vs. unsuccessful) utilization of the external hint. They pro-
posed that insight typically reflects transformative thoughts characterized by ef-
ficient recovery of information from memory and focused attention to a prob-
lem (Sheth et al., 2009). Characteristic changes in gamma oscillations asso-
ciated with insight were also reported by Bowden et al. (2005), who found a 
sudden burst of high-frequency gamma-band in scalp EEG reflecting neural ac-
tivity just before insight solutions. They concluded that solvers abruptly change 
the focus of their solving efforts just before insight, allowing information link-
ing various problem elements to manifest into consciousness (Bowden et al., 
2005). Some data also indicate, that for example artists as compared to non-
artists also show significantly higher phase synchrony in EEG in the high fre-
quency beta and gamma bands due to their ability of binding various details of 
the complex artworks to create internal representations (Bhattacharya and 
Petsche, 2002). 
Also other studies confirmed that increased gamma oscillations are closely 
associated with insight (Bowden et al., 2005; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008; Sandkuhler and Bhattacharya, 2008; 
Smith and Kounios, 1996; Uhlhaas et al., 2009) and conscious awareness re-




     





Edelman, 1998; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010). In this context insight corresponds 
to contextual awareness, emergence of new perspectives and creative solutions 
reflected in large scale information integration and its typical neural correlate is 
represented by increased synchrony in gamma range (Bhattacharya and 
Petsche, 2002; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). 
 
 
1.2.2. INSIGHT AND MENTAL DISORDERS  
 
The concept of insight in its relationship to mental disorders was proposed in 
the late nineteenth century and was closely linked to the first person perspec-
tive of viewing and understanding one’s own mental state that became crucial 
for diagnosis (Amador et al., 1991; Lysaker et al., 2013c; Markova and Berrios, 
1995; Mishara et al., 2014). For example, in Gestalt psychology the moment, 
when a person suddenly experiences the so called “aha!” phenomenon” related 
to a solution is interpreted as recognition of an organizing principle related to 
gestalt (Kohler, 1925; Marková, 2005). On the other hand from the psychoana-
lytical perspective insight mainly reflects a moment when a patient becomes 
aware of an inner conflict, when it emerges into consciousness not only just be-
cause of interpretations of unconscious contents but also due to self-
understanding (Sirois, 2012; Sugarman, 2003). 
In this context, insight is the most frequently understood as a conscious rec-
ognition of one’s own mental state or the degree of personal awareness or self-
understanding and on the other hand the term insight is also used for descrip-
tion of self reflective changes related to mental disorders (Amador and Gor-
man, 1998; Amador et al., 1991; David, 1990; Mishara et al., 2014). For exam-
ple, there are various reported studies describing lack of self-awareness and in-
sight in subjects with psychotic and depressive disorders (Crumlish et al., 2005; 
Mintz et al., 2004; Mintz et al., 2003), anxiety and hopelessness (Buchy et al., 
2009; Carroll et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2003) or in persons at risk of suicide 
(Bourgeois et al., 2004; Pompili et al., 2007).  
Useful tool to test this lack of awareness and its relationship to mental dis-
order provides for example the Scale to assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder 
– SUMD (Amador et al., 1993). Also other instruments have been proposed 
such as Insight and Treatment Attitudes Questionnaire (ITAQ) (McEvoy et al., 
1989), the Scale for the Assessment of Insight (SAI) (David et al., 1992; David, 
1990), the Self-Appraisal of Illness Questionnaire (SAIQ) (Marks et al., 2000), 
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) (Beck et al., 2004) and others (Bir-
chwood et al., 1994; Markova and Berrios, 1992).  
Using these diagnostic tools, later development in psychology of insight has 
been predominantly focused on research of cognitive deficits representing vari-
ous neuropsychological changes related to pathological perception of internal 
and external reality (Aleman et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2004; David, 1990; Ke-
shavan et al., 2004; Riggs et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2000). In this context, in-




     





anomalous experiences and atypical interpretations of events. For example 
Beck et al. (2004) using The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) assessed 
cognitive interpretations and self-reflectiveness that represents important condi-
tion for creating insight (van der Meer et al., 2010; van der Meer et al., 2013). 
 
 
1.2.3 AWARENESS OF INSIGHT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 
 
In recent reported studies, insight is most frequently studied in schizophrenia 
patients (Amador et al., 1994; Cuesta and Peralta, 1994; Lincoln et al., 2007; 
Weiler et al., 2000). For example, patients with schizophrenia have significant 
lack of insight about their personal situation and life perspectives (Amador and 
Gorman, 1998; Mintz et al., 2003; Sevy et al., 2004), which is closely linked to 
manifestation of defense mechanisms (Donohoe et al., 2004; Lysaker et al., 
2003).  
Other studies have also shown associations between lack of insight and psy-
chopathology in schizophrenia (Kemp and Lambert, 1995; Keshavan et al., 
2004; Mintz et al., 2003; Mohamed et al., 2009). For example, Mintz et.al 
(2003) in their meta-analysis found modest negative correlation between in-
sight and positive and negative symptomatology(Mintz et al., 2003). Also 
another study using data from Clinical Antipsychotic Trial of Intervention Ef-
fectiveness (CATIE) reported that higher level of insight at baseline is signifi-
cantly associated with lower level of schizophrenia symptoms (Mohamed et al., 
2009). In addition, lack of insight also manifests certain trait-like properties in 
patients with schizophrenia (Ayesa-Arriola et al., 2014; Comparelli et al., 2013; 
Cuesta et al., 2006; Hwang et al., 2009) that are closely linked to positive 
symptoms (Comparelli et al., 2013). 
Also neuroimaging studies using fMRI in patients with schizophrenia pa-
tients in comparison with healthy controls have shown that impaired insight is 
related to brain activation during self-reflection in the left insula, left inferior 
frontal gyrus and left inferior parietal lobule, and the bilater ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex, which suggest abnormal self-reflective processing and decreased 
introspection (Holt et al., 2011; Modinos et al., 2011; van der Meer et al., 2010; 
van der Meer et al., 2013). This neurocognitive concept of insight is also close-
ly associated with the Theory of Mind, defined as ability to understand mental 
states of others (Bora et al., 2009; Frith, 1992; Lysaker et al., 2010a; Sprong et 
al., 2007) corresponding to recent understanding of schizophrenia as a disorder 
of self-awareness and conscious experience (Ford et al., 2007; Lou, 2012; Ly-
saker et al., 2010a; Mishara, 2007; Mishara et al., 2014; Uhlhaas and Mishara, 
2007). Taken together these data indicate that typical insights deficits in schi-







     





1.2.4. COMMON ASPECTS OF NEURAL MECHANISMS OF CON-
SCIOUSNESS AND SCHIZOPHRENIA  
 
Conscious states represent manifestations of the brain activities represented as 
unitary, integrated and changeable process reflecting binding of diverse mod-
alities of basic informational and subjective components (Edelman, 2003; 
Edelman et al., 2011). According to recent findings there is a body of evidence 
describing consciousness and self-awareness as integrative processes based on 
large scale activities of the brain (Baars, 2002; Baars et al., 2013; Edelman, 
2003; Tononi, 2004; Tononi and Koch, 2008). Similarly as Descartes in his 
concept, also recent basic theories of information integration are focused on 
mechanisms of binding and suggest that binding between particular parts in the 
brain increases when information has to become conscious (Leisman and Koch, 
2009; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004). In this process input signals are con-
nected in the brain through the dynamic binding of feature specific cells, which 
enables formation of higher order assemblies underlying conscious awareness 
(Baars, 2002; Fries et al., 2001). This process of conscious awareness, when in-
formation reaches the conscious threshold is specifically represented by EEG 
changes, especially changes in the gamma range (Crick and Koch, 1990; Does-
burg et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1989; Gray and Singer, 1989). This basic finding 
has been documented by many studies that reported specific significance of 
synchronous gamma oscillations for conscious awareness (Baars et al., 2013; 






     









     








2.1. CONCEPTUAL DISORGANIZATION AND STRESS RELATED 





Research of cognitive disorganization in psychotic disorders is historically 
linked to the concept of “schizophrenia” proposed by Bleuler in his “Dementia 
Praecox, or the group of the schizophrenias” emphasizing disturbed association 
processes and conscious self-reflection (Bleuler, 1950a). In this book Bleuler 
described basic forms of mental disorganization in schizophrenia related to 
“loosening of associations”, which leads to displacements, condensations, con-
fusions and incoherence.  Recent description and understanding of “conceptual 
disorganization” is clinically defined by Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale 
as: “Disorganized process of thinking characterized by disruption of goal di-
rected sequencing, e.g. circumstantiality, tangentiality, loosed association, non 
sequiturs, gross illogicality or thought blocking”. Basic criteria for rating are 
mainly defined using clinical observations of cognitive-verbal manifestations 
(Kay et al., 1987). Recent findings suggest that first episode psychotic disord-
ers are closely linked to stressful events (Aiello et al., 2012; Reininghaus et al., 
2016; Varese et al., 2012). For example Walker and Diforio (Walker and Difo-
rio, 1997) proposed “a neural diathesis-stress model” of schizophrenia that in-
tegrates the psychosocial and biological research on stress in schizophrenia. In 
context of this model Read et al. (Read et al., 2001 & Connolly, 2001) devel-
oped “a traumagenic neurodevelopmental model”. The model is based on basic 
principles of the diathesis-stress model of schizophrenia and proposes that ge-
netic deficits create a predisposing vulnerability in the form of oversenstivity to 
stress related adversive life events which according to recent evidence present 
basic contributors to development of schizophrenia (Fan et al., 2008; Gil et al., 
2009; Liang et al., 2016; Lysaker and LaRocco, 2009; Scheller-Gilkey et al., 
2004; Vogel et al., 2009). Main mechanisms of this process present influences 
of traumatic events on the developing brain and neurobiological abnormalities 
that frequently occur in patients with schizophrenia, which mainly include 
overactivation of the HPA axis (Bremner, 1999; Read et al., 2001; Teicher et 
al., 2003; Teicher et al., 2006). Among specific influences of stress on brain 
functions belong influences on memory consolidation which significantly af-
fect fixating of new information in long-term memory (Lynch, 2004; 
McGaugh, 2000) and may also disturb mental integrity, and lead to dissociation 
of memory and mental experience (Bob, 2007; Lynch, 2004; Maroun and Rich-
ter-Levin, 2003; Vermetten and Douglas Bremner, 2004). The dissociated 
memories related to a traumatic event are often accompanied to increased sen-




     





form components of dissociation (Bob, 2008; Nijenhuis et al., 2004; Spiegel, 
1997). Recent findings suggest that repeated stressful events leading to an in-
crease in responsiveness to stress stimuli and increased vulnerability to stres-
sors may determine sensitization process that may have lasting consequences 
with kindling-like progression (Kraus, 2000; Popovic et al., 2016; Post et al., 
1997). 
Although the stressful influences on developing psychotic pathology 
represent very important etiological factors there is no evidence about relation-
ships of psychotic symptoms of conceptual disorganization, dissociative symp-
toms and sensitivity to repeated stressors that may lead to symptoms of limbic 
irritability manifesting as cognitive and affective symptoms that may manifest 
in temporal lobe and limbic epilepsy. With respect to recent findings we have 
tested a relationship of disorganization symptoms and their links to dissocia-
tion, limbic irritability, other stress related psychopathological symptoms, in-
sight and long-term cortisol response in hair samples in young women with the 
first psychotic episode.  
 
 




In the present study 50 adult young women, first episode psychosis inpatients 
were assessed immediately after admission to Psychiatric Hospital Bohnice 
(mean of age 28.36, age range 21-37, SD=4.66). All the patients gave informed 
consent and the study was approved by the hospital ethical committee. The pa-
tients had predominantly high school education 14.42 (SD=4.39) years. Pa-
tient’s diagnoses of the first episode psychosis were confirmed by clinical in-
terview according to DSM IV criteria and were also assessed by M.I.N.I. ver-
sion 5.0.0 (Sheehan et al., 1998). All the patients had their first hospitalizations 
and had no medication influencing CNS. Exclusion criteria were organic ill-
nesses involving the central nervous system, substance, and/or alcohol abuse, 
antiepileptic treatment, benzodiazepine and analgetic medication, mental retar-
dation (IQ Raven lower than 90) (Raven, 1960) and significant extra-pyramidal 
symptomatology. Two of the authors of this article independently reexamined 
the patient’s diagnoses according to DSM IV criteria (American Psychiatric 




The patients were interviewed using Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale- 
PANSS (Kay et al., 1987) that enables to assess typical positive, negative and 
global symptoms of schizophrenia (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81 for positive symp-
toms and 0.88 for negative symptoms). The PANSS enables to asses the con-
ceptual disorganization (PANSS- P2), reflecting disorganized process of think-




     





non sequiturs, gross illogicality or thought blocking (Andreasen et al., 1995; 
Smith, 1982). 
For investigation of childhood traumas, TSC-40 (Trauma Symptom Check-
list) (Elliott and Briere, 1992) was used. The TSC-40 is a 40-item self-reported 
questionnaire done on a 4-point Likert scale. TSC-40 evaluates symptomatolo-
gy in adults associated with childhood or adult traumatic experiences and 
measures aspects of posttraumatic stress and other symptom clusters found in 
some traumatized individuals. The Czech version of the TSC-40 has high relia-
bility and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 0.91, test-retest reliability af-
ter week 0.88). 
Psychic dissociative symptoms were assessed by Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES) (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986). DES represents 28 items self-
reported questionnaire examining main dissociative phenomena such as absorp-
tion, amnesia, depersonalization, derealization, reality distortion, and others. 
Subjects indicate a degree of their experience on the continuum from 0% to 
100%. In the present study we have used the Czech version of the DES that si-
milarly as original English version displays high reliability and internal consis-
tency (Cronbach’s alpha 0.92, test-retest reliability after week 0.91). 
Somatoform dissociative symptoms were assessed using the 20-item self-
reported Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20) (Nijenhuis et al., 
1996). Somatoform dissociative symptoms represent alterations in sensations of 
pain (analgesia, kinesthetic anesthesia), alterations of perception, loss of motor 
control, gastrointestinal symptoms, etc. Subjects indicate the degree of their 
experience on 5-point Likert scale. We have used the Czech version of the 
SDQ-20 that displays high reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach’s al-
pha 0.91, test-retest reliability after week 0.90). 
Complex partial seizure-like symptoms were assessed using complex partial 
seizure-like symptoms inventory– CPSI (Roberts et al., 1992). CPSI was origi-
nally designed to measure somatic, sensory, behavioral and memory symptoms 
associated with temporal lobe epilepsy (i.e. brief hallucinations, paroxysmal 
somatic disturbances, automatisms and dissociative disturbances). The invento-
ry has 35 questions and subjects indicate degree of their experience on 6-point 
Likert scale (Cronbach’s alpha 0.95, test-retest reliability after week 0.87). Ac-
cording to some data CPSI total score higher than 70 present a significant crite-
rion for the so-called epilepsy spectrum disorder but also lower values may in-
dicate an underlying electrophysiological dysfunction (Roberts et al., 1992). 
Although these symptoms were originally described in patients with temporal 
lobe epilepsy, later studies have found that transient sensory, cognitive, and af-
fective phenomena occurring in patients with complex partial seizures may be 
more common in patients with affective disorders and also in other psychiatric 
diseases than is usually known (Silberman et al., 1985; Varney et al., 1993). 
For the assessment of depressive symptoms was used Beck depression in-
ventory BDI-II (Beck et al., 1987) (in validated Czech version) that represents 
21-items questionnaire for assessing depression. Subjects indicate degree of 




     





Levels of anxiety symptoms were assessed using the Czech version of The 
Zung Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Cronbach’s alpha 0.89, test-retest reliability 
after week 0.85) (Zung, 1971). The SAS is 20-item self-reporting questionnaire 
focused on the most common general anxiety symptoms. Each question is 
scored on 4-point Likert scale from 1 to 4. 
 
Hair cortisol analysis 
 
For biochemical assessment, the hair samples were collected and according to 
common procedures three 1 cm long hair segments were provided by each par-
ticipant and the analysis was performed on the average cortisol levels across 
the three hair segments. Cortisol was analyzed using an ELISA kit for cortisol 
in saliva (CORTISOL SALIVA ELISA, Diametra). The results were assessed 
using photometric analysis ELISA (SPECTRA SLT) at the university biochem-
ical department. This analysis of cortisol levels in hair was shown to provide 




Statistical evaluation for results of psychometric measures included means, 
standard deviations, and Spearman correlation coefficients. All the methods of 






Results indicate that in the patients with first episode psychosis disorganization 
symptoms measured by PANSS conceptual disorganization symptoms (P2) 
manifest significant negative correlation with anxiety measured by SAS (r= - 
0.44, p<0.01), symptoms of dissociation measured by DES (r= - 0.35, p<0.01) 
and SDQ-20 (r= - 0.39, p<0.01) and complex partial seizure-like symptoms 
measured by CPSI (r= - 0.31, p<0.01), but no significant correlation with 
symptoms of traumatic stress and depression measured by TSC-40 and BDI. 
The symptoms of conceptual disorganization also manifest significant relation-
ship to hair cortisol levels (r= - 0.38, p<0.01). In addition the results indicate 
that PANSS conceptual disorganization symptoms (P2) manifest significant 






The results show that in the patients with first episode psychosis disorganiza-
tion symptoms are significantly negatively associated with anxiety, dissociative 




     





with symptoms of traumatic stress and depression. The conceptual disorganiza-
tion is also related to hair decreased cortisol levels and decreased insight. These 
results indicate reciprocal relationships of disorganization symptoms with dis-
sociation and somatoform psychopathology, anxiety, seizure-like processes, 
cortisol levels and insight. In context of other findings suggesting that dissocia-
tion in schizophrenia may play an important role (Lysaker and Larocco, 2008; 
Perona-Garcelan et al., 2008; Renard et al., 2016; Ross, 2004), these data sug-
gest that dissociative processes are opposite to disorganization although these 
processes in traditional conceptualization by Bleuler seem to be “two sides of 
the same coin”.  In this context, “mental fragmentation” related to disorganiza-
tion seems to play an opposite compensatory role as a defense mechanism 
against increased dissociative symptoms and other processes related to anxiety, 
decreased insight and somatoform (or somatization) processes related to soma-
toform dissociation, complex partial seizure-like symptoms and neuroendocrine 
processes reflected by cortisol. 
The results suggest close negative relationship of disorganization and com-
plex partial seizure-like symptoms reflecting increased neural sensitivity that 
may be linked to an imbalance in interactions between dopaminergic and glu-
tamatergic systems, altered dopamine neurotransmission and consequent altera-
tions in cognitive biases that present important and critical conditions in patho-
genesis of schizophrenia (Collip et al., 2008; Yuii et al., 2007). According to 
recent findings this increased sensitivity and imbalance of neural systems could 
be explained by sensitization that leads to an increased response to a certain 
stimulus, which at the beginning of this process was subthreshold and caused 
no or low response (Castner and Williams, 2007; van Winkel et al., 2008). A 
specific form of sensitization that could play a role in pathogenesis of schi-
zophrenia is progressively increasing response of groups of neurons due to re-
petitive subthreshold stimulation that may later lead to epileptic or epileptiform 
temporo-limbic activity (Glenthoj and Hemmingsen, 1997; Grossman et al., 
2003; Kraus, 2000). These findings potentially may explain treatment resis-
tance to usual antipsychotic medication in several schizophrenia patients and 
also clinical importance of an appropriate anticonvulsant medication, even in 
patients who do not display seizures or epileptiform abnormalities on scalp 
EEG (Johannessen Landmark, 2008; Tiihonen et al., 2009).  
Several data suggest that positive psychotic symptoms may be linked to 
hyperdopaminergic kindling in mesolimbic dopaminergic system (Adamec, 
1990; Grossman et al., 2003; Stevens, 1999). According to these findings dis-
charges related to increased excitatory neural activity may also be modulated 
by a regionally-specific compensatory upregulation of GABA-A receptors in 
response to decreased GABAergic input in hippocampal pyramidal cells 
(Heckers and Konradi, 2002; Mohler, 2006). In agreement with this role of 
GABA neurons in cognitive functions several findings also suggest that distur-
bances in GABA system might be related to stressful conditions (Benes and 
Berretta, 2001; Teicher et al., 2003; Teicher et al., 2006; Yuii et al., 2007), 
which is in agreement with significant relationship between disorganization 




     





In context of Ross’ conceptualization of the “dissociative schizophrenia” 
(Laferriere-Simard et al., 2014; Ross, 2004; Vogel et al., 2013), results of this 
study suggest that the patients with the first episode psychosis might be accord-
ing to their clinical symptoms divided into two subgroups, the first with high 
levels of disorganization symptoms and the second with high levels of dissocia-
tive and complex partial seizure-like symptoms which might have serious clini-
cal implications for using anticonvulsant treatment in the second group. 
 
 






The concept of insight and its relationship to mental disorders is most frequent-
ly understood as a conscious recognition of one’s own mental state or the de-
gree of personal awareness or self-understanding (Amador et al., 1993; Lysaker 
et al., 2013c). There are various reported studies describing lack of self-
awareness and insight in subjects with psychotic and depressive disorders, an-
xiety, hopelessness (Carroll et al., 2004; Mintz et al., 2003). In recent reported 
studies, insight is most frequently studied in schizophrenia patients. For exam-
ple, patients with schizophrenia have significant lack of insight about their per-
sonal situation and life perspectives (Amador et al., 1993; Beck et al., 2004). In 
addition recent research suggest that disturbances of self-awareness and con-
scious experience have a critical role in pathophysiology of schizophrenia and 
in this context schizophrenia is currently understood as a disorder characterized 
by distortions of the acts of awareness, self-consciousness and self-monitoring  
(Kircher and Leube, 2003; Mishara et al., 2014).  
Recent findings also suggest that first episode psychotic disorders are close-
ly linked to various disturbances of developing brain functions which in early 
stages of the disease mainly include overactivation of the HPA axis (Aiello et 
al., 2012).  With respect to recent findings we have tested a hypothesis of a re-
lationship between insight deficits and psychotic symptoms, and their links to 
neuroendocrine disturbances reflected by hair cortisol levels in 45 drug naïve 
young women at the beginning of their first psychotic episode 
 
 




In the present study 45 adult young women first episode psychosis inpatients 
were assessed immediately after admission to Psychiatric Hospital Bohnice 




     





hospitalizations and had no medication influencing CNS. Exclusion criteria 
were organic illnesses involving the central nervous system, substance, and/or 
alcohol abuse, antiepileptic treatment, benzodiazepine and analgesic medica-
tion, mental retardation (IQ Raven lower than 90). Patient’s diagnoses of first 
episode psychosis were confirmed by clinical interview according to DSM IV 
criteria and were also assessed by M.I.N.I. version 5.0.0. Two of the authors of 
this article independently reexamined the patient’s diagnoses according to 
DSM IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The patients had 
predominantly high school education. All the patients gave informed consent 







Experiences of insight were measured using Beck Cognitive Insight Scale 
(BCSI) (Beck et al., 2004). The BCSI is a 15-item self-reported questionnaire 
developed to assess patient’s ability to evaluate and correct their abnormal ex-
periences and misinterpretations of events. The questionnaire includes subs-
cales for self-reflectiveness and self-certainty measuring separate components 
of cognitive insight. In addition the BCSI enables to assess a composite index 
which is calculated by subtracting the score for the self-certainty scale from the 
self-reflectiveness scale. In the questionnaire the participants were asked to rate 
the extent to which they agree with each statement using a 4-point scale from 0 
(do not agree at all) to 3 (agree completely).  
The patients were interviewed using Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale- 
PANSS (Kemp and Lambert, 1995) that enables to assess typical positive, neg-
ative and global symptoms of schizophrenia (Cronbach´s alpha is 0.81 for posi-
tive symptoms and 0.88 for negative symptoms).  
For the assessment of depressive symptoms was used Beck depression in-
ventory BDI-II (Beck et al., 1987) (in validated Czech version) that represents 
21-items questionnaire for assessing depression. Subjects indicate degree of 
their experience on 4-point Likert scale. 
Levels of anxiety symptoms were assessed using the Czech version of The 
Zung Self-Rating Anxiety Scale- SAS (Cronbach’s alpha 0.89, test-retest relia-
bility after week 0.85) (Zung, 1971). The SAS is 20-item self-reporting ques-
tionnaire focused on the most common general anxiety symptoms. Each ques-
tion is scored on 4-point Likert scale from 1 to 4. 
 
Hair Cortisol Analysis 
  
For biochemical assessment, the hair samples were collected from the posterior 
vertex of the scalp because of the lowest coefficient of hair variation. The sam-
ples were analyzed according to common procedures three 1 cm long hair seg-




     





erage cortisol levels across the three hair segments. The samples were assessed 





Statistical evaluations were performed using the software package Statistica 
version 6 and included means, standard deviations, and Spearman correlation 





Results indicate that insight manifestations in the patients with first episode 
psychosis measured by insight composite index are closely related to positive 
symptoms assessed by PANSS (r= - 0.37, p<0.05). The process of insight 
represented by self-reflection subscale also manifests significant relationship to 
hair cortisol levels (r= 0.43, p<0.01). The results did not show statistically sig-
nificant relationships of insight manifestations as well as the hair cortisol levels 





In agreement with recent research the results show that levels of positive symp-
toms are related to insight deficits which are usually linked to disturbances of 
self-consciousness and self-monitoring that have a critical role in pathophysiol-
ogy of schizophrenia (Bob et al., 2016; Kircher and Leube, 2003) 
The results also show that the process of insight represented by self-
reflection manifests significant relationship to hair cortisol levels. These results 
represent novel findings suggesting that increased hair cortisol levels are posi-
tively associated with self-reflective experiences. This inverse relationship of 
self-reflection and hair cortisol may reflect a protective process against stress 
disturbances during the first psychotic episodes. This result is in agreement 
with findings and conceptualization of “eustress” related to anticipatory cortisol 
reactivity which suggests that manageable stress experiences may increase psy-





Results of this study report novel findings suggesting that hair increased corti-
sol levels are positively associated with self-reflective experiences in the first 
psychotic episodes. This result is in agreement with findings that the process of 
self-reflection may lead to anticipatory stress which may be reflected by in-




     





ing (eustress) is related to anticipatory cortisol responses which suggest that 
manageable stress experiences may positively influence psychobiological resi-
lience. 
  




     










     








According to recent research disturbances of self-awareness and conscious ex-
perience have a critical role in pathophysiology of schizophrenia and in this 
context schizophrenia is currently understood as a disorder characterized by 
distortions of the acts of awareness, self-consciousness and self-monitoring 
(Frith, 1987; Gallagher, 2000; Kircher and Leube, 2003; Lou, 2012; Mishara et 
al., 2014).  
This conceptualization of brain and cognitive disintegration in schizophrenia 
is reminiscent of the concept of ‘schizophrenia’ as “split mind” proposed by 
Bleuler in his Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias emphasizing 
the splitting or disintegration of consciousness (Bleuler, 1950b). Later word as-
sociations studies based on Bleuler’s ideas have found that responses of schi-
zophrenia patients to a stimulus word are often bizarre, idiosyncratic and with-
out expected context (Goldberg and Weinberger, 2000; Kent and Rosanoff, 
1910; Moran et al., 1964 1964; Shakow, 1980) and that the patients have spe-
cific deficits in the organization of semantic memory (Davis et al., 1995; Paul-
sen et al., 1996). This explanatory framework is in agreement with physiologi-
cal and cognitive theories of schizophrenia that have conceptualized underlying 
disorganization as a consequence of overprocessing of relevant information 
which enables to explain positive symptoms of schizophrenia as a compensato-
ry mechanism of a disordered information processing system (Bob, 2012; Carr 
and Wale, 1986; Lee et al., 2003). These data suggest that contextual informa-
tion exists within a frame of reference that enables semantic context integration 
(Pulvermuller, 2002; Shtyrov and Pulvermuller, 2007), which influences access 
to conscious experience and within this context the positive symptoms of schi-
zophrenia is possible to view as “contextual disturbances” (Gray et al., 1991; 
Hemsley, 2005).  
One of the proposed mechanisms involved in disturbances of Self and men-
tal disintegration in patients with schizophrenia is the mechanism of dissocia-
tion (Bob and Mashour, 2011). Dissociation is a special form of consciousness 
in which events that would ordinarily be connected are divided from one 
another (Li and Spiegel, 1992), which leads to ‘‘a disruption and/or disconti-
nuity in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, 
perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior’’ . In addition, 
there is a body of evidence showing overlap between mechanisms underlying 
dissociative symptoms and schizophrenia as proposed by Bleuler. Following 
Janet’s definition of dissociation Bleuler described that the process of splitting 
in schizophrenia is the same as splitting of psychic connections in hysteria and 
can lead to manifestations of alter personalities and typical amnesia (Bleuler 
and Brill, 1924)(Bob, 2003; Foote and Park, 2008; Janet, 1890; Moskowitz, 
2008; Van der Hart and Friedman, 1989). In this context, high prevalence of 
trauma history found both in schizophrenia (Read et al., 2005; van Os and Ka-




     





recent studies (Kihlstrom, 2005; Spiegel, 1997). In addition, several studies 
have shown that the level of dissociative symptomatology is strongly correlated 
with psychoticism and/or schizotypy (Moskowitz et al., 2005; Startup, 1999).  
As proposed by Scharfetter (2008) schizophrenic syndromes may represent 
a type of ego-fragmentation or splitting that can be understood as a special 
form of dissociation. Consequently these alterations in ‘‘self-representation’’ 
underlying specific ego-state related changes in subjective experience are likely 
related to specific alterations in connectivity of various parts of the brain and 
these alterations may manifest as abrupt changes in patterns of neural activity 
related to disintegration of conscious experience (Bob, 2004; Bob and Ma-
shour, 2011; Forrest, 2001; Gallagher, 2000; Putnam, 1997; Scharfetter, 2008; 
Taylor, 2011; Yates and Nasby, 1993). 
Together these studies suggest that the processes of disrupted awareness and 
conscious disintegration in schizophrenia likely might be related and 
represented by similar disruptions on the brain level, which in principle could 
be explained by various levels of disturbed connectivity, and information disin-
tegration that may negatively affect usual patterns of synchronous activity con-
stituting adaptive integrative functions of consciousness (Bob and Mashour, 
2011).  
On the other hand mental integration based on self-awareness and insight 
likely may significantly increase information integration and directly influence 
neural mechanisms underlying basic pathophysiological processes in schizoph-
renia. In this context, the human mind represents the form that influences brain 
and body, which has significant implications for psychotherapy that specifical-
ly may support self-awareness and insight representing metacognitive abilities 
as was reported in various studies (Lysaker et al., 2003; Lysaker et al., 2010a; 
Lysaker et al., 2013c; Mishara et al., 2014) and directly affect neural mechan-
isms of schizophrenia through influences of conscious integration on integra-




     









     









     









     









     









     









     









     









     









     









     









     









     











     









     









     










     









     





4.5. COMPLEX PARTIAL SEIZURE-LIKE SYMPTOMS IN-
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domí p edstavuje projev aktivit mozku, které zahrnují jednotný, integra ní a 
nlivý proces, odrážející vazbu mezi rozdílnými modalitami základních 
informa ních a subjektivních komponent. Podle sou asného výzkumu hrají 
zm ny v domí a sebeuv dom ní významnou roli v patofyziologii schizofrenie 
a asto zahrnují zvýšenou aktivaci hypothalamo-hypofyzární osy. Studie pou-
kazují na to, že proces poruchy uv dom ní a dezintegrace v domí u schizofre-
nie spolu pravd podobn  mohou souviset a být zp sobeny obdobnými 
zm nami na úrovni mozku, které pak mohou být vysv tleny r znými stupni 
narušení konektivity a zpracování informací, což negativn  ovliv uje b žný 
vzorec synchronní aktivity tvo ící adaptivní integra ní funkce v domí. 
S ohledem na tento kontext je ú elem teoretické ásti diserta ní práce popsat 
základní neurobiologické mechanismy provázející integra ní procesy v mozku 
spolu s komplementární duševní aktivitou zahrnující sebeuv dom ní a náhled, 
které odrážejí návzájem propojené procesy psychiky a mozkové aktivity, což 
implikuje p ímý efekt psychoterapie a dalších metakognitivních aktivit na 
funkci mozku.  
První ást empirického výzkumu zkoumá konceptuální dezorganizaci a její 
ležitou roli v patofyziologii schizofrenie. Podle sou asného výzkumu mohou 
být epizody první psychózy úzce spojeny se stresovými událostmi, které mohou 
souviset se senzitizací a specifickými neuroendokrinními zm nami. V tomto 
kontextu jsme zkoumali souvislost mezi symptomy dezorganizace, disocia-
tivními a somatoformními symptomy a dalšími p íznaky souvisejícími se stre-
sem, které zahrnují hladiny kortizolu ve vlasech u dosp lých mladých žen 
s první psychotickou epizodou.  
Metodika: V rámci klinické studie jsme vyšet ili 50 hospitalizovaných pa-
cientek, mladých žen s prvozáchytem psychózy. Hodnotili jsme p íznaky de-
zorganizace a  pozitivní a negativní symptomy schizofrenie (PANSS), stres a 
disociaci (TSC-40, DES, SDQ-20), symptomy podobné komplexním par-
ciálním záchvat m (CPSI), p íznaky deprese a úzkosti (BDI-II, SAS) a kortizol 
ve vlasech. 
Výsledky: Data ukazují, že u pacient  s prvozáchytem psychózy p íznaky 
dezorganizace signifikantn  negativn  korelují s úzkostí, disociací, symptomy 
podobnými komplexním parciálním záchvat m a hladinou kortizolu ve vlasech.  
Záv r: Výsledky této studie poukazují na to, že pacienti s prvnozáchytem 
psychózy mohou být rozd leni podle klinických p íznak  do dvou podskupin. 
První, s vysokou hodnotou dezorganizace a druhá s vysokou hodnotou dis-
ociace a symptom  podobným kompelxním parciálním záchvat m, což m že 
mít významný klinický dopad pro lé bu pacient  s psychotickým 
onemocn ním.  
Ve druhé ásti empirického výzkumu jsme navázali na studie, které ukazují 
ležitou roli narušení sebeuv dom ní a v domého prožitku u patofyziologie 




     





hypofyzání osy. Hodnotili jsme vztah mezi náhledem a kortizolem ve vlasech u 
mladých žen na po átku první psychotické epizody. 
Metodika: V rámci klinické studie jsme vyšet ili 45 mladých žen s první ep-
izodou psychózy. Hodnotili jsme psychopatologii schizofrenie (PANSS), 
náhled (BCIS), depresi a úzkost (BDI-II, SAS) a hladinu kortizolu ve vlasech.   
Výsledky: Výsledky ukazují, že pozitivní symptomy m ené PANSS 
negativn  korelují s kompozitním indexem náhledu. A dále, že náhled ve složce 
sebereflexe vykazuje signifikantní pozitivní vztah s hladinou kortizolu ve vla-
sech.  
Záv r: Studie p ináší nové výsledky poukazující na to, že zvýšená hladina 
kortizolu pozitivn  koreluje s prožitkem sebereflexe u pacient  s první epizo-
dou psychózy. Tyto výsledky jsou ve shod  s nálezy, že proces sebereflexe 
že vést k anticipa nímu stresu, který m že být doprovázen zvýšeným korti-
zolem. Tento nález je ve shod  s d kazy, že pozitivní coping (eustres) souvisí 
se zvýšenou odpov dí kortizolu na dob e zvládnutý stres, který m že pozitivn  






     








Conscious awareness is related to brain activities represented as unitary, inte-
grated and changeable processes reflecting binding of diverse modalities of ba-
sic neural informational processes and their subjective components. According 
to recent research disturbances of self-awareness and conscious experience 
have a critical role in pathophysiology of schizophrenia, which in early stages 
of the disease mainly include overactivation of the HPA axis. Together these 
studies suggest that the processes of disrupted awareness and conscious disin-
tegration in schizophrenia likely might be related and represented by similar 
disruptions on the brain level, which in principle could be explained by various 
levels of disturbed connectivity and information disintegration that may nega-
tively affect usual patterns of synchronous activity constituting adaptive inte-
grative functions of consciousness. In this context, a purpose of the theoretical 
part of the disertation is to describe basic neurobiological mechanisms underly-
ing integrative processes in the brain with its complementarily related mental 
activities including self-awareness and insight reflecting interrelated processes 
between mind and brain that implicate direct effect of psychotherapy and other 
metacognitive activities on the brain.  
The first part of empirical research included in this study was focused on 
cognitive disorganization and its critical role in the pathophysiology of schi-
zophrenia. Recent findings indicate that first episode psychotic disorders are 
closely linked to stressful events which might be related to “kindling-like” sen-
sitization and specific neuroendocrine changes. In this context, we have ex-
amined relationships between symptoms of disorganisation in adult young 
women with first episode psychosis, dissociative and somatoform symptoms 
and other stress related symptoms including hair cortisol. 
Methods:  In the clinical study 50 inpatients, adult young women with first 
episode psychosis, were assessed for disorganization symptoms and other posi-
tive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia (PANSS), stress symptoms and 
dissociation (TSC-40, DES, SDQ-20), complex partial seizure-like symptoms 
(CPSI), depressive and anxiety symptoms (BDI-II, SAS) and hair cortisol. 
Results: The data indicate that in the patients with first episode psychosis 
disorganization symptoms manifest significant negative correlation with anxie-
ty, dissociation, complex partial seizure-like symptoms and hair cortisol levels.  
Conclusion: These results suggest that the patients with the first episode 
psychosis might be according to their clinical symptoms divided into two sub-
groups, the first with high levels of disorganization symptoms and the second 
with high levels of dissociative and complex partial seizure-like symptoms 
which might have serious clinical implications for treatment of psychotic dis-
orders. 
In the second part of the empirical research we have followed and developed 
recent research studies that disturbances of self-awareness and conscious expe-




     





ogy of schizophrenia which in early stages of the disease mainly include over-
activation of the HPA axis. We have assessed relationships of insight and hair 
cortisol levels in young women at the beginning of their first psychotic episode. 
Methods: In the clinical study 45 inpatients, adult young women with first 
episode psychosis, were assessed for schizophrenia psychopathology symptoms 
(PANSS), experience of insight (BCIS), depressive and anxiety symptoms 
(BDI-II, SAS)  and hair cortisol. 
Results: Results show that positive symptoms measured by PANSS are ne-
gatively associated with insight composite index. The process of insight 
represented by self-reflection also manifests significant positive correlation to 
hair cortisol levels.   
Conclusion: Results of this study report novel findings suggesting that in-
creased hair cortisol levels are positively associated with self-reflective expe-
riences in the first psychotic episodes. This result is in agreement with findings 
that the process of self-reflection may lead to anticipatory stress which may be 
reflected by increased cortisol. This finding is in agreement with evidence that 
positive coping (eustress) is related to anticipatory cortisol responses which 
suggest that manageable stress experiences may positively influence psychobi-
ological resilience. 
 
 
